Interview: Mortgage Originator Explains the Crisis

Please click above to listen to full interview.

Mike sat down with David, a former mortgage originator during the boom times.  They discuss the move into Subprime lending, the causes of the crisis, and shockingly, whether it was all worth it.

David:  Hi my name is David and I used to be a mortgage underwriter and originator.

Mike: David, thanks very much for joining me.  Can you give me a little bit of background to what is a mortgage underwriter and originator doing. What does that mean?

David: I started out originating.  I was the one making phone calls.  My initial contact was with the customer directly.

Mike:  So, the customer comes in, and I think you said you started in the year 2000?

David:  Yeah it was in 2000 and it was right before, or right I guess right at the start of the whole refinance boom.  My territory was Northern and Middle California. So that’s kind of where everything starts.

As the Great Mortgage Crisis of 2008 slips into history, a consensus builds that the biggest breakdown of the system occurred because the different links in the mortgage production chain knew what they knew, and acted in their own self interest, but nobody knew enough of what the others knew.

I thought of this recently as I sat down with David.  He worked as a mortgage originator precisely the same time I worked as a mortgage bond salesman.  During that time, I never talked to a mortgage originator.  Nobody I ever worked with on Wall Street ever sat down with the guys originating mortgages to compare notes.  It never occurred to us.  An economist might call this breakdown in communication ‘informational friction.’  You might call it ‘stupid.’

Cogs during the Mortgage Boom Times

Mike: So [from] 2000 to 2001, I’m interested in part because it parallels where I was.  I joined the mortgage bond department in the end of 2001, which it sounds like you’d been at the job for a year. And what we were experiencing on the Wall Street side of things was an extraordinary boom in origination just the mortgage pipeline had never been bigger.  Everybody essentially who owned a home already would benefit from refinancing.  So everybody was refinancing at a breakneck pace.  I’m assuming from where you were sitting that your business was booming, and you have something to offer that everybody wants, right?

David: That’s exactly what it was, and that’s part of the reason that I got the job of there, was I didn’t have any financial experience previous to that, I was a salesman as I had done for years and years before that. And a friend of mine that worked in the personnel department at the bank knew that, and knew that they were coming up on this huge boom of refinancing.

Since we were mainly dealing with A and A+ paper, the most qualified borrowers, there was never a situation where we had to sell things that they didn’t need.  We just had an influx of people calling and an influx of business, and they needed people who could handle that.  The department that I worked for grew exponentially over the two years that was there.

The phones were literally ringing off the hook, in the end of 2001, to refinance homes or to take home equity out because the rates were so good.

But back in those days, at least in the beginning, business was booming and everybody made money.

David: There was no risk involved at the time.  If you got a borrower in from Northern California, from Carmel, who – say he made, you know, $3 million per year, and he’s got an 820 FICO, what do I care?  He’s going to put 20% down, even if, for some reason, he falls off the face of the earth and he goes 6 months and he defaults, we get the house back into our portfolio because we paid for it, it’s our money.  We sell the house again through our real estate side. Or through a realtor that we know, we make money on that, and we’ve got this 20% down, his $250,000 initially.  There was absolutely no risk involved in lending to those types of borrowers.

Mike: There was just so much volume going through the system and everybody qualified essentially and everybody had home equity.

David: Yeah it was a flood.  And our big territory was California, and that was like the beginning of like the tech boom.  All the software guys were out there.  And Google hadn’t even started yet, it was Yahoo and Microsoft and these guys were just collecting money and their bank accounts were huge and they really couldn’t account for all of it because they didn’t get normal paychecks or they got bonuses, or this and that, but they had perfect credit and they had a lot of money and we sold them houses.

Mike: So we know now, in the macro picture, 9/11 happens, the Fed lowers interest rates, there’s extraordinary amounts of money looking for some return, all the models say that mortgage are a great place to get a return, so on the investor side everybody wants mortgages, and on the retail side, everybody wants to refinance their house, which has gone up in value, so its just this awesome machine, and I was also a cog in the machine, in doing my bit.  When you’re a cog in the machine it’s not always, it’s not obvious to us what this is all going to lead to.

The Move to Subprime and Alt-A Lending

And then two great new types of mortgage origination came along.  Alt-A, which meant you could provide much less information than on a traditional mortgage application, and Subprime, which meant you could get a mortgage even though you did not have a history of actually paying your bills.  We started to dive into that where I worked, and David’s two employers during that time period also entered the exciting new world of people with marginal credit and minimal screening of their applications.   Again, so much money was being made.

I joined the Goldman mortgage desk in the end of 2001, beginning of 2002.  and at that time Goldman had, pretty much that month, there was a guy named Kevin Gasvoda, he’s a Vice President and he’s got this mandate to get Goldman into this business because we’d realized that Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were taking/stealing our market share in the mortgage department and we didn’t have a subprime or Alt-A program.  And Goldman had basically not gotten into that business because of reputation risk, and we didn’t quite trust that these people would pay the money back, but suddenly in 2002 we were going to invest in that, and the models say that looking back over the last five years everybody does pay their subprime mortgages back. And Alt-A is a perfectly safe product if you structure it correctly, and by the way Lehman and Bear are making tons of money doing this, they are just printing money.

I distinctly remember this kind of back and forth from, internally at Goldman of ‘Should we be in this market?’

In the ‘90s they’d decided not to be, but by 2002, kind of just as I was joining, they were saying ‘We cannot NOT be in this market, we have to be there.  We’ve not trusted it in the past but we’ve got to be there and it/s growing so fast.  That’s my side of the subprime thing, so what’s going on, on your side, while that’s happening?

David: That’s pretty much, actually that’s exactly, almost exactly parallel to what was happening at my bank.    It went from a kind of normal application process, so a normal application form, we’d call their bank for verification, they’d submit income, assets, they’d submit pay stubs that kind of thing, like you would nowadays if you went to get any mortgage, anybody.

Six or seven months into my stay there, so middle of 2001, we didn’t care anymore.  I was literally getting applications with a social security number, a name, a job description, and a bank account statement, and that was it, and we’d write them a check for a million dollars.  And that was happening all day long because it didn’t matter.

Six or seven months into my stay there, so middle of 2001, we didn’t care anymore.  I was literally getting applications with a social security number, a name, a job description, and a bank account statement, and that was it, and we’d write them a check for a million dollars.  And that was happening all day long because it didn’t matter.

Mike: The process of just social security number, job, that was for A-Paper, that’s high quality borrowers, that’s 2001

David: Those would be our no income, no asset borrowers,

In other words, Alt-A paper

David: they come in, we run their credit, and they’ve got an 820 FICO

Mike: Perfect credit, we’ll cut you the check

David: Yeah, we’ll give you what, it’s not a big deal.

David then moved over to USAA Bank, but did not enjoy the subprime market as much.

David: Um, I was there really briefy because I don’t, I didn’t think they were going in the direction that I wanted to go in, as far as that’s concerned…the jumped immediately into the, uh, mid-level and subprime lending because what’s they wanted to get into.

Mike: All the models said, sub-prime people actually paid back, if you looked the previous four years, they all refinanced and paid their money.

David: Absolutely all the math worked.  But the thing is if you look back four years on anything it’s going to work.  If you look eight years or ten years or sixteen years…you’d have to look as far back as the Great Depression – recently – to find where the curve was.  It’s so big it’s hard to see the whole thing especially when you’re focusing on making money like everybody else was.

The reason I didn’t like it so much was they were gearing more toward sub-prime people, and I could obviously see they were starting to lend to borrowers who were not going to be able to pay stuff back.

I’m not saying anything about about USAA bank, obviously everybody was starting to do it at the same time. Because you’re right everybody said “They’re going to pay us back” even though we knew if you give somebody with a 40% debt ratio and you mitigate that by a credit score they still don’t have enough money to pay the loan back, no matter what their credit says and that credit might say that now I mean six months from now and eight months from now it’s going to drop 100 points because they just defaulted on the mortgage you sold them that was, that was out of their means.  And that’s why I said I’m not gonna kind of do this anymore.

David moved back to a customer service job at a private mortgage broker, something he enjoyed immensely, in contrast to the previous work with Subprime and Alt-A borrowers.

The American Dream Business, Gone Bad

David: That was the opposite side of what I was doing before, where we were just handing out checks to people, you know, four or five years previous to that.  And didn’t care about anybody or anything, just making money, this was helping people get into houses.  And actually, like, making their dream come true. It’s not that trite a sentiment when you’re actually doing it.   When you actually are able to call somebody and say we’ve got your loan approved, you’re going to get this house.  It’s much more satisfying than just signing your name on a piece of paper that’s worth a million dollars.

Mike: So you, but you enjoyed that part of it?

David: Absolutely

Mike: It was satisfying to be originating and brokering mortgages for folks.

David: Yeah, and that’s kind of the, that was the fun part, was doing that, versus trying to sell products that probably weren’t suited for somebody to them, and thinking always in the back of your head, is this person going to lose their house, are we going to lose money, is everybody.  Like, this is starting to kind of not, not be agreeable anymore.

 

David: Yeah, and that’s kind of the, that was the fun part, was doing that, versus trying to sell products that probably weren’t suited for somebody to them, and thinking always in the back of your head, is this person going to lose their house, are we going to lose money, is everybody.  Like, this is starting to kind of not, not be agreeable anymore.

Small Mortgage Errors Compounded With Great Leverage

So, back to the economists, and the information frictions.  One of the things I really liked talking to David about was bridging that information gap.  What is it he knew, that Wall Street should have known.  Its too late of course, but still, what if mortgage originators, mortgage bond salesmen, and mortgage investors had actually spoken to each other in the run up years to 2008?

Mike:  With the benefit of hindsight lots of people have pointed out that all along the mortgage chain each person was doing their job more or less properly as they saw fit, and each person was acting in their own self interest and yet somehow there was information lost.  Somewhere between either the models don’t take into account enough past information on the investor or bank structuring side, homeowners aren’t taking into account the idea that real estate values don’t always go up, they also go flat and they also go down.  On the mortgage origination side lots and lots of banks went under because they sold wholesale packages to Wall Street, which then stopped taking them and putting them back and it just bankrupted the mortgage originators who couldn’t take back the, at that point, unsaleable mortgages.

So everybody got hurt, and yet it’s interesting because every one of us was trying to do the best we could.  In the back of our minds “Huh, something’s not quite going right.”  Do you have any anecdotes of having talked to homeowners about something being not quite right.

David: What I look back now and think about were all the times where we…we you stretch it a little bit.  And if I’m stretching this person’s income by $1,000, or if they’re telling me they make you know $3,500/month, versus $3,200/month and I see their pay statements and it kind of makes sense and I’m just cursorily looking over it and signing off on it, well, that $300 has to come from somewhere, theoretically.  That’s kind of what happened, and I’m that one person.  And there’s one hundred of me.  And there’s a thousand of my departments, and there’s a thousand of my banks.  If you take all those little stretches and flubs and oversights that don’t mean anything at the time because you’re either caught up in writing a loan or making a deadline or a quota

Mike: Keep your volume up, make your monthly number.

David: Or even at the best, helping somebody get a house.

Mike: Right

David: All those things have to come from somewhere, that’s not just…they don’t just go away.  So if you approve this person, or don’t approve this person, or you approve too many of these people, or a hundred of your compatriots are doing the same thing at exactly the same time then the numbers start to skew from the model to actuality and it’s like gaining weight or getting fat, you don’t notice it

Mike: it’s only a half pound per month, but a year later…you’re a lot fatter

David: Exactly, you don’t notice it until you’re 50 pounds overweight a year later, and then you start thinking about all the times you had an extra serving of ice cream, or you didn’t stop at, you know, two pieces of cheese, or whatever it is.

Mike: You’re making me feel guilty

David: Yeah, me too.

Mike: I like your explanation that the income has to be $3,500 [per month] but it’s actually $3,200 and there’s this missing $300/month, that where it’s close enough so we’ll just pass it on

David: Yeah

Mike: And yet, $300/month, you know, it gets put on the credit card and then eventually you’re talking about…

David: And that’s what it is

Mike: …You’re $20,000 in the hole and your house is in foreclosure.

David: It doesn’t seem like a lot to me.  Because I’m thinking, “Yeah, no, this is fine.”  Its only $20/month on their payments to give them this versus this, but 20 times a year, times thirty years, your asking this person to repay back thirty thousand dollars more than they are currently able to.  And that’s assuming that their position is going to get better, instead of assuming their position is going to stay the same or get worse which is what actually happened.

Mike: It gets pretty geared up, pretty leveraged.

David: Yeah.

Mike: Small mistakes get amplified.  On the Wall Street structuring side, where we knew to the Nth degree how to exactly satisfy the letter of the law with respect to how the rating agencies needed bonds to be structured – not the spirit of it, not we’re going to make some safe AAA-rated bonds and some A-rated bonds then BBB-rated bonds, but precisely the letter and not a single iota of wiggle room is you take those $300/month off income and then you gear that to the Nth degree of what the rating agencys will let Wall Street get away with.

All of the mortgage business was entirely a, what we would call a rating agency arbitrage, where you’re just doing precisely the thing that will get you the rating you need to sell it to your investors, but with the no wiggle room, and then as the origination is happening that way, even if you have a slight hiccup it’s all going to come down.

Was It All Worth It?  David Says Yes

Towards the end of our conversation David and I were getting a little bit philosophical and then he surprised me, by saying the entire mortgage debacle might have been worth it.  I had never met anyone who would say that outloud.  But David did.

David: Yeah. That’s something I think about too.  If it wouldn’t have worked out so well for everybody – yeah it went to something bad but – if that money wouldn’t have been made would everything still have kept rolling or would have just been kind of steady or stagnant.  Let’s say you win the lottery, and you go out and you spend all your money in a year. Who’s to say that wasn’t the best year of your life?  And it wasn’t worth spending all of that money on?

Mike: Were the gains in the lead up from say, 2000 to 2007, bigger than the ultimate loss of a steady-state of just steady growth?

David: and that’s coming from someone who isn’t rich, who isn’t wealthy.  I didn’t make, you know, tremendous gains.  I was just a regular employee.  I made a good paycheck, a regular salary but it wasn’t, it wasn’t anything I could retire on.  It wasn’t anything or it wasn’t going to have to work the rest of the, the rest of my life. So, just to be clear about who is actually saying this. It’s not someone who has, who has profited from that big wave, and I’m sitting on a big pile of money giving, giving an interview saying how good it was. This is someone who will has to work a job everyday for the rest of my life because the industry now probably couldn’t support what it did back then.  And I still think that that might have been worth it to get where we are now to know what we know.

Mike: yeah it’s an interesting thing that most people are not saying, which is, the boom might’ve been worth the bust. Is that in a sense what you’re saying?

David: Yeah

Mike: both from a knowledge as well as from a wealth standpoint?

David: Yeah

Mike: That’s a really unusual statement.

David: It’s the position of someone who’s watched it from the inside and then the extreme outside. Someone who gas prices matter to, who knows what a gallon of milk costs.  And, it still seems to me that the experience and that the situation is okay now, it’s not as dire I don’t think as people are making – it was – in like 2007 and 2008 when we almost actually literally lost everything.

Mike: we were staring at the financial abyss, living in caves

David: Yeah it was really close.  It was a financial Holocaust. It was going to happen. Everybody was going to lose everything, at the same time. And banking was going to stop. But it didn’t.  The fact is it didn’t, because we took everything that we had learned from the previous seven or eight years and said “Okay, this isn’t going to work.  We’re seeing it not work.”

If that wouldn’t have happened, would we have even seen that.  Would the curve have been shallower and longer, and had more detrimental effect, if the spike wouldn’t have been so great when it was.

Mike: I think that’s really interesting.  Most people don’t have your philosophical approach to it. I don’t know either way.

David: As I said, it’s not to mitigate or to rationalize, you know, the millions of dollars that I made, because I haven’t.  And it’s not positive just to be positive about it, to kind of negate others things or to ignore it.  I’m by nature a very pragmatic person.  But even that.  You have to at least accept that the experience was worth it.

 

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Book Review: The Big Short, Inside the Doomsday Machine

In one obvious respect, The Big Short follows Michael Lewis’s winning formula for a blockbuster book on sports or finance: character sketches so compelling, funny, and sympathetic that he makes an arcane industry understandable by the average reader.

Less recognized, but even more impressive, however, Lewis bucks the dominant trend in media coverage of the 2008 Crisis.  Lewis does what almost nobody else in journalism has even tried over the past few years, namely, he makes the short-sellers the heroes.  He makes us root for:

  • The plucky one-eyed neurologist Michael Burry with Asperger-spectrum personality, whose investors repeatedly tried to betray him
  • Steve Eisman, a down-beat and beaten-down stock analyst covering the least glamorous industry, subprime lenders
  • Two entrepreneurial founders of a seemingly Too-Small-to-Succeed hedge fund Cornwall Capital

Only Deutsche Bank mortgage trader Greg Lippman gets profiled as the arrogant gunslinger that we’ve come to expect from financial journalists, and the profile is so specific that you can’t help but think Lippman must be exactly like that.

Most coverage of the Crisis gives the strong sense that innocent homebuyers were tricked by greedy bankers and their Wall Street enablers into mortgages they could not afford to pay back.  The popular press rarely mentions the basic idea that lending to people who cannot and will not pay back their mortgages is not a strategy or a goal of bankers and their Wall Street enablers.  It happened, but it was not their plan.

Lewis’ has the gumption not to defend, but to celebrate, the few clear-headed folks who managed to profit while the financial herd – bankers and borrowers alike – ran themselves off the edge of a cliff.

Start with The Big Short to get a clear sense for the players, triggering events, and financial technology of the Great Credit Crunch of 2007 and 2008.  It’s as good as anything else written on the Crisis to date.

 

Also see my review of Michael Lewis’ Liar’s Poker – The best book on Wall Street ever.

and see my review of Michael Lewis’ Boomerang – Funny, if not terribly substantive.

Please also see related post, All Bankers-Anonymous Book Reviews in one place.

 

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What The Dimon Hearings Today Are Really About

The Senate Banking Committee long-ago proved itself to be not a truth-seeking body, but more of a combination woodshed and green room, in which distinguished financial guests get paddled mercilessly by one Party, while coiffed and flattered by the other.  Senators play at Congressional inquiry in the interest of the public good, while keeping a keen eye on the opportunity for scoring points in their internecine battles.  Today’s distinguished guest Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan Chase’s chairman and chief executive, got his chance to receive the paddle and the flatter.

In a perfect world, it’s nobody’s business whether a bank makes a mistake in risk management and loses a nominally large, but clearly manageable, amount of money.  The JP Morgan losses from the London Whale, compared to the magnitude of its balance sheet[1] as well as the magnitude of 2008-era banking write-downs[2], amount to a tiny hiccup.  In a risk management sense nobody should care[3].  In a public welfare sense as well, regardless of what the Senators say, nobody should care about the London Whale losses.

We live in a far from perfect world, however, and recent history (i.e. 2008) teaches us that large, private banks’ losses can become massive public liabilities pretty quickly.  Nevertheless, the London Whale losses are largely irrelevant.

Do not be confused by the real issues at stake here.  Nominally, Dimon was invited to respond to his bank’s recent trading losses attributed to the London Whale, which he did.  In truth, the topic is to what extent the so-called Volcker Rule, intended to limit proprietary trading by regulated banks, will be put into effect.

That debate matters, and it harks back to the central issue facing bank regulators today.  Namely, should deposit-taking banks be in the business of securities trading?  It’s a front-burner, Top 3-most-pressing-financial-issues-of-the-day question.

In other words, can we return to a Glass-Steagall Act era, in which deposit-taking banks are not also acting like hedge funds?  Those are the stakes, and they deserve serious discussion, such as we did not get today from the Senate Banking Committee.  We got lecturing and posturing but we did not get serious discussion.

Two other thoughts.

As a betting man, and as one with a view on where Senators’ bread is buttered, I think there’s no chance they have the foresight, financial independence or cojones to really roll back the union of deposit taking banks and proprietary trading banks.  We’re just not returning to the regulatory environment of the mid-1990s.[4]  It wasn’t that long ago, but the Clinton-era unleashing of these Too Big To Fail behemoths has created too many deep-pocketed interest groups.  So don’t hold your breath on that one.

Second, while it may not be obvious to everyone, Congress has a funny way of rewarding relatively positive risk management.  I don’t know Jamie Dimon and I have no reason to flatter him[5], but the firm has performed far better than most.  The London Whale losses stand out precisely because JP Morgan navigated the Credit Crisis much better than almost anyone.

I know it’s hard to ask the public in this environment of “Banking CEO = Greedy Vampire Deserving of Public Stake-Burning” to distinguish between good and bad actors, but the Senators should at least make the attempt.  The Senators do, after all, accept their campaign contributions.

So many other CEOs besides Dimon deserve the woodshed treatment.  In my opinion the most reprehensible banking CEOs (or any financial executive for that matter) are the ones who receive extraordinary personal pay before leaving massive public liabilities in his wake.  Ken Lewis at Bank of America, Sandy Weill and Vikram Pandit at Citigroup, Stanley O’Neal at Merrill Lynch, Franklin Raines at Fannie Mae, Joe Cassano at AIG, and Angelo Mozilo at Countrywide are easy examples, although there are many more.

If you can wrap your mind around good guys in the banking world, compared to that rogue’s gallery, Jamie Dimon would be one of the good guys.



[1] To give an idea of size, the approximately $2Billion loss from the London Whale trades represent less than 7% of their loan-loss reserves, 1% of their equity, and 0.5% of their investment portfoio

[2] During the Credit Crisis of 2008 many of the TBTF banks reported losses 10X this size, multiple times!

[3] Except obviously the risk management folks at JP Morgan.  When I say ‘nobody’ I mean the rest of us.

[4] that separated deposit-taking banks from securities trading banks

[5] In fact I kind of enjoyed making fun of him here.

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Another Corzine Rant

One last rant, and then I’ll rest a while on MF Global and Jon Corzine.[1]

Yesterday’s news[2] pointed out the regulators’ problem that only Corzine, and not his Treasury department subordinates like Edith O’Brien and Henri Steenkamp, had registered as professionals subject to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the primary regulator of a trading shop like MF Global.  The CFTC could more easily sanction registered members of MF Global for negligence, without having to prove criminal intent,[3] but only Corzine (of those 3) is registered and therefore subject to sanctions.

This matters, and it doesn’t matter.

This matters because it potentially focuses the CFTC’s main firepower on the top, where it should aim.  If anyone is to be responsible for a $1.6 Billion customer money ‘misplacement,’ that person should be the one in line for the $12.1 million severance package.[4]

It doesn’t matter because Corzine should always be the main focus of any regulatory probe in the first place.  Not only is he the relevant figure in the enterprise, but as I explained earlier, his subordinates could not credibly have acted on their own to commingle customer funds to satisfy margin requirements.  I just don’t believe it.

 

Please also see Arrest Jon Corzine Now

and Update on Jon Corzine by the MF Global Trustee



[1] At least until he’s arrested, or proven innocent.

[2] Sorry, it may be behind a pay wall, but I’ll summarize for you.

[3] This is somewhat analogous to OJ Simpson losing his civil case to the family of his murdered wife, while remaining ‘innocent’ in criminal court.  The standards of proof are WAY easier.

[4] Which Corzine declined following the bankruptcy filing of MF Global, to his credit.  But still.

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Book Review: Too Big To Fail

You may, like me, be curious about what happened during the Great Credit Crunch.  You may, like me, have the feeling we reached a financial precipice, peeking over the edge into the abyss.  But before falling in we blacked out and woke up in the hospital, a thick IV needle in the arm, tired and confused but otherwise basically OK, thinking, “But, but, but, wha, what happened back there?”

Andrew Ross Sorkin wants to answer this question for us in Too Big to Fail, his bestselling account of the eight most dramatic months of the Great Credit Crunch.  It begins in March 2008 with the demise of Bear Stearns, peaks the week of September 15 2008 (Lehman declared bankruptcy, Bank of America agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch, and AIG got its first $85 Billion bailout by the Federal Reserve) and ends in October 2008 with the mandatory TARP investments by the US Treasury in nine systemically important – aka Too Big To Fail – banks.

Sorkin covered the crisis for The New York times via his Dealbook column, and has a lot to offer us as that front-line journalist, under nearly war-time conditions of high stakes and daily – even hourly -changing conditions.  For sheer personal access to the leading protagonists, as well as the rendering of real-time conversations, Too Big To Fail is a helpful first brush at history.  No doubt the movie attracted even more attention than the book, because, well, most people would rather watch a movie than read.

For all the attention and acclaim he received for his A-list account of the Great Credit Crunch, however, Sorkin has two big problems.  The first is a minor stylistic issue, the second a fundamental difficulty.

Look, Sorkin had a problem in writing this book; namely, how to make concrete action out of events that took place primarily on the financial ledgers of governments and banks.  These ledgers do not exactly provide riveting visuals, and I definitely get the feeling Sorkin planned to sell the movie rights before he finished Chapter One.  So visuals were key to his plan.  As a way to create cinematic action Sorkin highlights every swift swipe of the Blackberry from Hank Paulson’s pocket, every frenzied snatch for the phone while riding in a Town Car zooming away from the Federal Reserve.  There’s a lot of gasping and ‘Oh my God!’ horrified looks as bank executives read the latest risk report on their phones from their loyal lieutenants.  Paulson’s phone in particular plays a fetishistic role in the book, constantly moving from his ear to his pocket and back.  It’s just a quirk of style on the one hand (movie rights must be sold!) but it is nevertheless distracting and silly.  Sorkin tries to show the high stakes danger facing Paulson and his deputy Neil Kashkari, but instead merely brings to the reader’s mind Crockett & Tubbs shouting into their oversized car phones, buzzing the Day-Glo storefronts of Miami in 1985.

The more fundamental problem with Too Big To Fail stems directly from Sorkin’s strength as a New York Times journalist – his access to financial executives and government officials.  They needed him to tell their story, and he needs them to write his story, but their pact of mutual benefit results in a narrative with no bad guys.  In Sorkin’s story, every Dick Fuld, every Tim Geithner, every Lloyd Blankfein and every Jamie Dimon is just a high powered guy with a Blackberry doing his darndest to survive this financial firestorm.  They gave extraordinary access to Sorkin, they will give extraordinary access to Sorkin in the future, and there’s really no point in painting any of them in a negative light, now is there?

Hank Paulson made this book happen through repeated interviews with Sorkin, in his attempt to get his (Paulson’s) version of the crisis on the record first.  As a result, the one exception to Sorkin’s rule of mutual benefit is Chris Flowers, who clearly got so under Hank Paulson’s skin (their historic antagonism goes back to the ‘90s when both were at Goldman) Sorkin shows him as the backstabbing, untrustworthy thief that he probably is.  In this case, Sorkin risks an unflattering portrayal (and really, the shocking thing is that ONLY Flowers is shown in this light) because he needs to present Paulson’s version of the truth.  Reading Too Big to Fail I kept thinking that the Wall Street I know has got a lot more unsavory characters than just Chris Flowers.

I do not mean to imply that I prefer a book bashing the heads of Wall Street firms.  There are plenty of those, and frankly they’re even less helpful than Sorkin’s book.  What we do need, however, is some analysis that might make Sorkin’s sources uncomfortable.  We need a chronicler of the Great Credit Crunch to contextualize what happened, to explain the forces at work that put us in this situation in March 2008 in the first place.  Less necessary is Sorkin’s entire book – which can be summed up as: ‘There were a bunch of aggressive but basically good guys working late nights and weekends to save their bacon and that of their firms, and it was really scary but kind of exciting to be there with them.’

If you read the news as obsessively as I did during that period, you know the basic facts, and Sorkin tells us a lot more basic facts of who said what to whom, and when, and what late model Blackberry they used.  But now we’re lying groggy in the ICU with that thick IV muttering, “OK, I know WHAT happened, but WHY?”

Please also see related post, All Bankers-Anonymous Book Reviews in one place.

 

 

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Update on Corzine – From the MF Global Trustee

The New York Times’s James Stewart provides excellent details from the MF Global Trustee report that corroborates in part my speculative narrative on Corzine’s  actions in the last week before his firm’s bankruptcy last Fall.

Stewart concludes his story saying, “a comparatively low-level employee like Ms. Edith O’Brien[1] should never have sole authority to tap segregated customer accounts.”  Crucially, however, Stewart had already reported that Ms. O’Brian hardly had any authority at all, as she had reluctantly followed her superiors’ orders:

Ms. O’Brien, who had to approve such transfers, was also worried about the firm’s growing liquidity needs and where the cash would come from. “Why is it I need to spend hours every day shuffling cash and loans from entity to entity?” she wrote in an e-mail in August, describing the process as a “shell game.”

After tapping customer funds on October 26, 2011 for an intra-day loan to meet margin requirements to JP Morgan, this relatively junior treasurer was left in the dark and terribly exposed.

The funds weren’t returned by the end of the day, which caused “panic” in Ms. O’Brien’s operation, according to the report. Ms. O’Brien demanded, in an e-mail, to know when the funds would be returned, adding in capital letters: “I NEED TO KNOW NOW.”

Corzine reportedly personally told JP Morgan that the firm’s use of segregated customer funds on October 28, 2011 was proper.  Yet on October 29, the very next day, O’Brien pointedly refused to sign a letter to JP Morgan certifying that the customer funds were properly used, in direct contradiction to Corzine’s representation.

The Trustee for MF Global has yet to file civil or criminal charges.  Ms. O’Brien, rightly it seems, pleaded the 5th Amendment to avoid self-incrimination during Congressional testimony.

Based on the Trustee report, O’Brien appears to be a person who knew where the criminal line was, and refused to cross it.  Corzine?  Unclear.

Here’s the depressing problem though:  Who will be made to pay the price?  Corzine the CEO, Senator, and Governor?  Or O’Brien, the Assistant Treasurer?

 

Please also see my earlier post Arrest Jon Corzine Now

and Another Corzine rant

 



[1] A Chicago-based assistant Treasurer

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