Audio Interview: Gary Sernovitz on Fracking Personalities

Note: I reviewed Gary Sernovitz’ book in September, and we did a phone interview back then, which I’ve now posted as an audio interview, Part I – on the big personalities in fracking. Part II – on environmental issues, will follow. I recommend listening to the audio version, but I’ve posted a transcript of our conversation as well.

Mike:               Hi, my name is Mike, and I used to be a banker.

Gary:               And I’m Gary. I guess I’m sort of still a banker, at least a private equity investor.

Mike:               Perhaps more importantly, you’re also ‑‑ full name, Gary Sernovitz the author of, among other things, The Green and the Black: The Complete Story of the Shale Revolution, The Fight Over Fracking and the Future of Energy. Thanks for talking.

Gary:               Thanks for having me.

Mike:               As you know, I read and really enjoyed your book, and I reviewed it on my site. I just want to praise you for doing what I think is my favorite thing, which is taking a complex issue upon which nobody agrees, and everybody thinks the other side is complete fucking idiots, and saying no, we’re not all idiots. We could understand each other. So thank you for doing that. That’s really great.

Gary:               Thanks for the praise and clearly, that is not the dominant mode of American discourse, as evidenced by the discussions heading into November.

Mike:               Yeah, it’s really difficult to not see the other side as either morons or dupes or evil. And I would say if you just say the word “fracking” we’ve already introduced the idea the other side is one or all of those things. I appreciate you describing yourself as a New York liberal. And I described you as deep in enemy territory there for fracking, and yet you have to both answer for your profession, which is to be investors in energy and in oil and gas and fracking, but at the same time, be a thinking person.

Gary_sernovitz
Gary Sernovitz

I don’t know who’s more unattractive, oilmen or Wall Street guys, but every once in a while, I’ll say something mildly positive about a Wall Street guy in some column and people will write inevitably “You’re such a jerk talking about the banksters as if they’re not all evil.” Okay, sorry.

Gary:               I manage to work for a private equity firm that invests in the oil and gas business to be the worst of both worlds.

Celebrities of Fracking – Aubrey McClendon

Mike:               Some of the interesting parts about your book are combinations of celebrating capitalism, and ingenuity of the shale revolution, and incremental changes. And then part of that celebrating capitalism is celebrating some of the funny and interesting characters who made good off of the thing.

I’m interested in some of those. Some of them I’ve heard some of their names but don’t particularly know them, but I understand they’re rock stars of your industry. I’d love to chat about those if you don’t mind.

One, your favorite seems to be Aubrey McClendon who I guess died after you’d written the book. I don’t think you referenced his death, or maybe you do?

Gary:               No, he died in what is not terribly clear ‑‑ whether it was self-inflicted or not, but drove about 80 miles an hour into a highway overpass the day after being indicted.1 Obviously, a lot of speculation on the timing of that.

Aubrey_McClendon
The late Aubrey McClendon, from a 2011 cover story

Mike:               Certainly looks suspicious, as a complete outsider.

Gary:               The conclusions most people have drawn ‑‑ but I think there has been no official word from the investigation one way or the other. Not necessarily that there needs to be, but the funny thing about the book is there was an alternate book that was just sort of a straight biography of McClendon that kind of was impractical to write with my job and with need to write ‑ he’s backed by a firm in his later life that competes against my firm in terms of providing capital to oilmen. I ended up putting that to the side.

Mike:               There’s a book worth or more of Aubrey McClendon stories?

Gary:               Yeah, sort of every chapter you find he’s Zelig of the book. In every chapter he kind of finds his way. There is a small Aubrey biography woven through it unwittingly, just because he is one of the more colorful characters. He kind of harkens back to a different kind of swashbuckling capitalism. Partly he enters the oil business, kind of a wildcatter, and partly he did have a very unusual role just that effectively the company he had, Chesapeake, was thought of as somewhat small, sort of volatile, high risk.

Mike:               A wildcatter spirit of a company versus the more corporate people?

Gary:               And hold onto your seatbelts when you deal with Aubrey and Chesapeake in general. When the shale revolution started ‑‑ it wasn’t really him, it was another company, Mitchell Energy that started it. So when it started, what Aubrey did was really kind of sort of start this competitive frenzy in successive basins where people would discover oil, maybe we have a shale here in north Louisiana or east Texas or North Dakota on the oil side, or Pennsylvania or Ohio. And Aubrey had thousands of guys knocking on doors, and an unlimited appetite for capital and complexity, and everything that just got billions of dollars.

Then everyone looked around and oil companies pursuing more normal course ambition ‑‑ “Well, Aubrey’s going to suck up all the opportunities!” and so he was the catalyst in these basins for this frenzy. Then ultimately, you know what happened was he kind of didn’t fully grasp ‑‑ no one did, how good this was going to be. So he ended up with a lot more gas and crashed the price of gas. So many basins worked, and successively cheaper prices, and that happened on the oil side, and then also just any companies with too much debt heading into a downturn is always going to be in trouble. He kind of got a margin call on his personal account for two billion dollars.

Mike:               I should be so lucky someday. I will be so upset when I get a two-billion-dollar margin call.

FrackingGary:               That’s how much he was worth at the peak. I don’t know what the margin calls was for but my net worth went down by a couple billion dollars. Then he kind of got kicked out of Chesapeake because of all sorts of other somewhat old-school CEO perks that are sort of beyond ‑‑

Mike:               Sort of pledging shares, right, for his own purchases?

Gary:               More like he had the right to buy interests personally in all the oil wells Chesapeake owned, which is a thing ‑‑

Mike:               I see, a conflict of interest.

Gary:               Yeah, just kind of was not done that much anymore. Then he got backed by a private equity firm and they bought eight billion dollars of properties, oil properties right before the oil price collapsed. The bigger issue facing him was not really this indictment, which is somewhat on a pretty secondary issue, but really was on financial difficulties, and five or six different companies all bleeding cash, and all big debt problems.

Just sort of the world coming in ‑‑ he owned 20% of the Oklahoma Thunder and he had pledged that for a loan. I think maybe it was last weekend [September 2016] for some reason he needed to have the largest collection of Bordeaux in the world. So that’s being auctioned off now by his estate. Somewhat in bad form, and got a lot of bad publicity. He had pledged 20 million dollars to Duke his alma mater.

The_Green_and_the_blackMike:               I read about that, that Duke said “where’s our 20 [million]?,” and the heirs didn’t find that tasteful.

Gary:               Oh, the Duke alumni, the Duke community ‑‑ just say yeah, that’s a charitable donation. It is unclear what will happen, but it is definitely a very 19th century or very early 20th century, Dreiser story of rising and falling and rising and falling.

Mike:               Captain of Industry or Robber Baron type.

Gary:             Outside the realms of normal corporate America or the norms of it. Obviously kind of very entertaining but did have an impact on it. He was known to be an extremely nice guy.

Mike:               Presumably a gregarious salesman type.

Gary:               Yeah, he wasn’t cynical. His margin call was on buying – insatiably – stock in his own company, so he obviously believed in it. He was not a dark figure but an irresponsible figure, then left a lot of obviously shareholders, partners, and everything holding the bag, based on sort of a wild irresponsibility in terms of how he built his business.

Mount Rushmore of Fracking – Lucky or Good?

Mike:               What I liked about your ‑‑ on the one hand celebration of capitalism and innovation and in a sense “here’s the new shale billionaires” ‑‑ you have a “Mount Rushmore” of four of them, who rose above the others. On the one hand, we have a tradition in the United States of celebrating these people as paragons of capitalism and far-seeing geniuses, of which Aubrey is included with that, with Mark Papa from EOG and this guy Harold Hamm, and I guess George Mitchell, one of the originators of the techniques.

Sernovitz has a "Mount Rushmore" of fracking
Sernovitz has a “Mount Rushmore” of fracking

But then I appreciate that you also say there’s an aspect of the story which is these guys have just sort of dumb luck combined with bizarre personalities, like you’re describing with McClendon with his appetite for risk and appetite for everything ‑‑ I appreciate it. And then trying to figure out: Are these guys just beholden to their own personalities and limitations and that’s why they did these odd, risky, crazy things, which turned out to be “right place, right time,” at the right scale? Which is obviously huge they all did that.

There’s this awesome passage which I’d also like to read, which is among my favorites of the whole book, which is describing Aubrey:

“Aubrey feels sometimes like seeing the country’s best restaurant critic blissfully eating from a box of day-old donuts. People respect the critic for the sensitivity of his palate, but maybe the man just likes to eat.”

I really liked that.

Gary:               That’s brilliant.

Mike:               It is really. It encapsulates that we celebrate these capitalists for their amazing talent and yet I don’t know, maybe the guy’s slightly insane and just has no taste at all. It’s just awesome, but of course, I love day-old donuts too. I can relate.

Gary:               I think people in the oil business are very fond, and this is probably in any business, “My successes are because I’m smart; his successes are because he’s lucky.” Being in a business one gets a bit more color on who was lucky, who was smart. Most people are some combination thereof. But I think the thing to remember about the entire industry is before the shale revolution the US onshore ‑‑ we had a company in Corpus [Christi] working in South Texas, about drilling wells for 400,000 dollars to find 2 million dollars’ worth of gas.

Mike:               Scratch and peck kind of little tiny companies.

Gary:               Yeah. And anyone in the oil business, like Exxon, which looked in contempt at the US onshore business as a bunch of losers who couldn’t make it doing big international stuff in Kazakhstan or offshore Angola or Equatorial Guinea. There was a certain very admirable hustle, that kind of never-say-die that kept ‑‑ people shouldn’t have been drilling before ’98 in the US if you think about where were the best reserves of oil and gas.

It was just – globally – it was just the infrastructure wasn’t there to displace it. Then the shale revolution came and suddenly ‑‑ the amazing thing wasn’t just that actually underneath the stuff that these guys were scratching and pecking, as you say, were an amazing volume of oil and gas but actually oil and gas was a lot cheaper to extract than the stuff Exxon was doing.

Mark Papa

It’s one of these stories of “the first shall be last, last shall be first” that really came out of nowhere. And everyone got caught up in it. Then there’s all these micro stores because there’s a lot of basins that have risen. Think about there in Eagle Ford, which is the one closest to you guys. Eagle Ford now is – the most shale wells have been drilled in Eagle Ford. It’s now kind of a mature basin. It was really developed by EOG, gets a lot of the credit ‑‑ Mark Papa.

Mark_Papa
Mark Papa left EOG in 2013

And kind of was one where it was a stealth play. And then there’s this mad rush for the Eagle Ford. Now the Eagle Ford is kind of considered well, there’s A) it’s drilled up a lot, and some of it’s more natural gas, and some of it’s more natural gas liquids, and it’s not that good. And by the way, if you go to West Texas, the Permian, there’s an Eagle Ford stacked on top of another Eagle Ford. There’s all these thousands of feet of different benches you can drill horizontal wells in.

Eagle Ford is now considered okay, a little mature, maybe some opportunities, but you’re only interested in moving back there if you can’t find anything in the Permian in West Texas and New Mexico. There’s dozens of different kinds of stories of rises and falls and the business ‑‑ there’s not just a lot of amazing oilmen who picked exactly the rise and fall correctly. There were some who were just there in a basin that ended up rising. And there are some that did guess it correctly. There are some who came in too late and ended up losing a lot of money.

Mike:               There’s a bunch of things I want to follow up on that. One is the Permian which I don’t know much about but a month ago [September 2016] the general newspaper readership got a sense that Apache Energy had a huge find. I want to follow up on the “genius capitalists” of the thing.

There’s a local guy who I don’t know personally, but was celebrated around the discovery of the Eagle Ford. Suddenly this guy I hadn’t heard of before, named Rod Lewis became a known shale revolution gas billionaire. Part of his legend – and I don’t think he appears in your book, is as a very blue-collar guy checking old oil wells and then ‑‑ sudden success is always overnight and it took 20 years that we didn’t know about…

But you do describe a guy, and I don’t know if you have stories about him or his thing, but you do have a thing that sounded very similar to that, in your book. Terry Pegula, who sounds similarly this blue-collar guy in the business of helping plug old oil wells and then suddenly seems to, out of nowhere, have acquired a massive amount of leases, which is then first worth a billion and then three or four billion a couple years later. Do you know the Rod Lewis story to tell? Local people might be interested. I’ve only heard basically what I just told you.

Terry Pegula

Gary:               Petro-Lewis is a very well respected company and definitely considered one of the Eagle Ford’s central private play. I don’t know his story particularly, but Terry Pegula, who now owns the Bills2 and Sabers and the savior of Buffalo was definitely almost like a hoarder of leases.

terry_pegula_and_wife
Terry Pegula and wife Kim

Mike:               Clean your stuff out, man. We’re going to call the cops on you. He was that guy?

Gary:               Yeah, and would take them from other companies with the agreement that I will plug these wells ‑‑ a natural gas well sometimes can produce for a century maybe, at very low volumes, but it gives you the right, based on the lease, to actually drill beneath it. Even if you have a well producing 50 dollars a day of stuff, it does give you the optionality ‑‑

Mike:               Vertically you can go below that existing small-producing well.

Gary:               Yeah. He didn’t do that on purpose. No one thought when he was hoarding these leases that there was going – Qatar was going to be in Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. He was just doing it because he liked doing it. I think also as a car dealer once said to my wife his view, “If it’s free, it’s for me.” People would just give it to him because it took liabilities off their hands. I don’t know the Petro-Lewis story but that’s one of those kind of amazing stories, sort of the wheels of markets and capitalism and fortune and luck and idiosyncratic histories that people like to wrap up sometimes in a more heroic narrative.

Mike:               We love the narrative of the blue-collar guy making good. That’s a pleasing capitalist ‑‑ it’s terrible when the rich remain rich. It’s great when the poor suddenly make it rich.

Harold Hamm: Humble, but sensitive, Trump supporter

Gary:               That’s why Harold Hamm, hearing him getting offended by “fracking,” he is the single person who’s gotten richest individually off the shale revolution. He is one of 13 kids, a sharecropper in Oklahoma, who barely graduated high school. Never went to college. Didn’t have shoes until he was six. A story out of a different century and now is the 70th richest man in the world. He signed a giving pledge with Bill Gates.

Mike:               I think you described him getting into North Dakota because he was one of these losers who had no other chance.

harold_hamm_donald_trump
Continental Resources CEO Harold Hamm endorsed Republican Presidential front runner Donald Turmp.

Gary:               Exactly. He admits it. He’s a humble guy in some ways. He kind of admits “I couldn’t afford what we were paying” ‑‑ basically you’re paying option value for leases in North Dakota.

And I heard Harold Hamm speak, and he gave a very pro-Trump soliloquy, like 45 minutes long with slides, more of a presentation. He talked about a very obscure argument. I don’t even know what happened, but Trump came to Colorado and also said basically the same thing Hillary said, which is communities should be allowed to regulate fracking in their backyard.

And Hamm’s like: “Forgive my friend Donald. He didn’t know what he was saying. He agrees with me.” Even the word “fracking.” He’s one of Trump’s chief supporters. And he made it clear that if you use the word fracking around him, the conversation is over, because it is an insulting term to describe hydraulic fracturing.

Mike:               Okay, words matter and that’s a hurtful word for him.

Gary:               Yes.

Mike:               Okay. He sounds a little sensitive, but anyway.

Gary:               You’d think 70th richest man in the world and 12 billion dollars would make you less sensitive. Apparently,  that’s not the case.

Mike:               Words have power and he’s a man who can be hurt by that word.

 

Please see related audio post (upcoming)

Part II with Gary Sernovitz – on the environmental issues of fracking

Before becoming an oil private equity guy, Gary Sernovitz was the next F. Scott Fitzgerald, and authored two novels, Great American Plain, and The Contrarians.

Please also see related posts:

Book Review: The Green And the Black: The Complete Story of the Shale Revolution, The Fight Over Fracking, and The Future of Energy  by Gary Sernovitz

Natural Gas Revolution – Corporate, Well-capitalized

Mad Max Bizarro World – South Texas

Audio Interview with Bryant on Fracking, and Regrets

 

 

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  1. The indictment came down in March 2016
  2. Just found this story from 2014 and Trump’s tweets about getting beaten by Pegula in a bidding war for the Bills. Trump, ever the petulant child.

School Finance FrightMare in Houston

choice_between_two_evilsVoters living within the Houston ISD catchment area on November 8th face a “Scylla and Charybdis” vote – and it’s not Clinton vs. Trump – but rather equally terrible public school funding choices.

What’s happening in Houston gives Texans everywhere an insight into a complex problem with no easy solutions, as Glen Read the general manager of budgeting and financial planning for HISD explained to me in a conversation recently.

A “yes” vote on the ballot question in Houston will authorize “the board of trustees of Houston Independent School District to purchase attendance credits from the state with local tax revenues,” which means sending an estimated $162 million from the state’s largest school district to a state education fund, known as the Foundation School Program (FSP). It also means future payments from HISD in increasing amounts in future years, as Houston’s property values increase.

A “no” vote – barring legislative intervention this Spring – triggers something that has never yet happened in Texas, which is to separate commercial properties from HISD’s tax rolls and assign them to other school districts. Like I said, neither of these choices feels good.

houston_isdIt’s also an opportunity – albeit a painful one – for Texans to learn more about a financing system which the Texas Supreme court in their May 2016 ruling named “Daedelean,” “Byzantine,” “Augean,” and an “ossified regime ill-suited for 21st Century Texas,” while simultaneously declining to over-rule previous legislative decisions.

These upcoming payments from HISD have been mislabeled “Robin Hood” and “recapture.” But “Robin Hood” is a terrible nickname for this upcoming process, for two reasons, having to do with the definition of “wealthy” and for the specific meaning of “recapture.”

First, labeling HISD a “wealthy” district is odd. The “wealthy” designation that triggers HISD’s payment comes from a math formula – specifically the ratio of total real estate property values to student population, with a few adjustments to the population number for attendance rates plus specific student designations. The “wealthy” label does not take into sufficient account a measure that seems more important to me, like the fact that 76 percent of HISD kids are designated “economically disadvantaged.” Robin Hood – the mythical man in tights – did not after all make a habit of stealing from the poor.

augean

Second, also unlike our mythical Robin Hood that “recaptured” money does not necessarily get redistributed to poorer school districts. Now, this is the point where Texans everywhere should sit up and pay special attention. Right here. Ready?

HISD’s “recaptured” money goes into the state’s primary education fund – the FSP – but that money is not doled out subsequently to poorer districts. This is the key point. The math ratio of property value to student population determines which districts pay money in to the FSP and which districts take money out of FSP, but none of that determines whether the state, as a whole, allocates sufficient money to the FSP. In fact, as property values rise locally – and you, the taxpayer, pay more – you’re not really funding your local district, or even the poorer districts. You are relieving the state of the obligation to pay more for education. More money into the FSP from higher property values means less the state has to pay. That’s the finance trick you need to know.

And that’s really nice if you’re trying to save money at the state level, but not exactly Robin Hood-style redistribution, nor a great plan for funding great public education.

For these reasons, The Houston Chronicle editorial page has twice urged a “No” vote, and which would trigger either the never-before-enacted property-tax-separation method or daring the state legislature to try something different before July 2017 – when property rolls would shifted. To be clear, a “No” vote is a sort of game of financial chicken between the voters of Houston and the state, with unknown consequences.

We can do what we usually do about this type of thing, which is to shut off our brains in order to take comfortable refuge behind pre-existing ideological prejudices, and take potshots at the other side’s idiocy. But if you are under the impression that you could start a conversation about school finance with “All we need to do is…” then you are mistaken. This subject does not admit of easy solutions.

 

Hacking our way intelligently through the overgrown jungle of public school finance, we have to hold a number of contradictory thoughts in our head simultaneously. For what its worth, my process goes like this:

  1. The socioeconomic background of an individual student appears to affect student outcomes far more than funding-levels-per-student at a school or district. As a result, poor performance at poor schools and higher performance at wealthier schools can persist indefinitely, despite roughly equal funding-levels per student. “Social reproduction” – or a society with little economic mobility – can’t be undone easily by throwing more money at the problem.
  2. And yet, just giving up on the idea of economic mobility – our hope that poorer kids have a chance to get ahead in life through a combination of hard work and a good education seems – I don’t know, what’s the word? Maybe: Un-American?
  3. When we talk about public school finance in Texas, really what we’re talking about is educating poorer kids: 59 percent of kids in Texas public schools overall are classified “economically disadvantaged.” The school districts subject to ballot questions that I’m writing about this week and next week, in the Houston and San Antonio ISDs, educate 76 and 92 percent economically disadvantaged kids, respectively.
  4. To which I conclude that we can’t fix this quickly with more money, or by simply equalizing scarce resources, but at the same time, to not try to improve it some how, some way, some day is to resign ourselves to a bleak future of haves and have-nots with no end in sight.

I have no sodaedalean_mazelutions. I’m just trying to educate myself on one of the most complex finance problems out there.

I can see that the HISD ballot question is a terrible choice to make.

 

A version of this ran in the San Antonio Express-News and Houston Chronicle

 

Please see related post

The San Antonio ISD ballot question (upcoming)

 

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Hello Houston

The Houston Chronicle recently started running my stuff, and I’m excited.

In honor of my introduction to Houston, I’d like to offer a personal story about my very first trip to Houston. Best of all, this anecdote has a pithy financial moral at the end.

In Spring 2001 I lived in New York City and sold emerging market bonds for Goldman Sachs. “Emerging markets” means Latin American, Asian, Eastern European, Middle Eastern and African bonds – all very volatile products. It was a super-fun job. I had recently picked up a new client – a couple of clever guys who operated a hedge fund within a successful pipeline company in Houston.

houston_chronicleI set up a visit to Houston because, of course, I already knew this company’s reputation. They dominated not only their pipeline business but had financially engineering their way into oil and gas trading, water-rights and paper-trading, and now a sophisticated, relative-value, emerging market bond hedge fund. (If the words “relative-value emerging market bond hedge fund” make perfect sense for you, then congratulations. If they don’t, then this column is for you.) Anyway, Fortune Magazine named them “America’s Most Innovative Company” for six years in a row. These guys were my kind of client.

First trip to Houston

We drank cocktails together in a fancy Houston bar while I listened to my clients describe the keys to their success.

“We just have the smartest guys in every business we tackle, and we know how to go after a business and make money off it.”

I was so convinced. I’m not kidding.

The smartest guys, with the best ideas, and all this awesome financial engineering? What could possibly go wrong? Personally, I planned to invest in the stock of that pipeline company as soon as I got my next bonus. Which, fortunately for me, was many months away.

For the next few months I spent a fair amount of my free time researching the company on my Bloomberg terminal. The amazing thing about Bloomberg terminals – for those of you who haven’t worked on Wall Street – is that I could find anything and everything about the company I could ever want or need. Historical earnings data and future projections. Analyst reports. News stories. Key executive bios. Charts and graphs and comparisons. I even personally knew key executives there! I loved my clients, and I loved this stock. And I couldn’t wait to get paid, so I could start investing in all those smart guys with all their innovative financial techniques.

enronBetter lucky than good

One of the most important lessons I learned in my Wall Street years is that it’s far better to be lucky than good. (That’s not the previously-promised pithy moral lesson, but it is true.)

Enron collapsed in the Fall of 2001 – before I got paid my bonus – so I never poured my own money down that rat hole. But boy was I eager to do it – only weeks before they collapsed.

Ever since then, whenever I hear people tell me about an individual stock they have bought, or plan to buy, and their reasons for doing so, I think of my clients at Enron.

What I learned from this Enron experience is that – not unlike Lord Commander Jon Snow – I know NOTHING when it comes to picking a good stock to buy. I thought I had access to EVERYTHING. And yet, I was completely wrong.

What I’d like you to know also – that promised pithy financial moral is right here – is that when it comes to picking individual stocks, you also know nothing.

My “I believe” speech, Bull Durham-style

annie_savoySo, I don’t believe in individual stock-picking when it comes to money matters and being smart.

“Well now,” you, as Susan Sarandon’s character Annie Savory in Bull Durham, might ask, “what do you believe in then?”

“I believe in getting wealthy,

Markets, cost discipline, the power of compounding,

Aggressive allocations, never selling, and neighborhood poker (if you like to gamble),

That Jim Cramer’s finance shows are self-indulgent, dangerous, garbage fires.

I believe Lee Harvey Oswald could not have acted alone.

bull_durhamI believe there ought to be a constitutional amendment outlawing variable annuities and the carried interest loophole.

I believe in index funds, entrepreneurship, selling investments only when you have to have the money and never for ‘timing” or ‘tax’ reasons, and long, slow, deep, soft automatic retirement-account dollar-cost averaging that lasts five decades.”

“Good night,” I whisper, as I turn and walk out the door, Crash Davis cool.

Leaving you/Annie/Susan Sarandon character breathless to say anything but:

“Oh my.”

 

A version of this ran in the Houston Chronicle and the San Antonio Express News.

 

 

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Public Pensions – The Big Four In TX

the_bigger_they_comeA key reason why I started a discussion of public pension funds in Texas by saying “Don’t Panic” is because 88% of Texans covered by a public pension plan are participants in one of just four plans, and the good news is that none of these four are in distress. Right now.

 The largest four pension plans – Teachers Retirement and Employee Retirement System (TRS), Employees Retirement System of Texas (ERS), Texas County and District Retirement System (TCDRS) and Texas Municipal Retirement System (TMRS) – cover over 2 million Texans. So no distress means you can stay calm.

On the other hand, if you had a worrying kind of paranoid view of public pensions – like I kind of do – you would notice that size should inversely correlate with complacency. The bigger they come, the harder they fall, as Jimmy Cliff and others point out.

The problem of size

If the Teachers’ pension system goes poorly – or any of these four go poorly – we can’t rely solely on my three rules of thumb to alert us.

We need an additional layer of scrutiny because the absolute scale of the problem is what we should worry about. The bailout for miscalculating on this scale might swamp the state budget.

This is what people in California worried about in the aftermath of the Great Recession in 2010, or what people in Illinois this year worry about. Namely, might the entire state of Illinois have to seek bankruptcy (or its legal equivalent) as a result of unfunded pensions?

Review of the Big Four

Four state pension plans dominate the Texas public pension scene, with over 2 million Texans participating.

texas_teachers_retirementOf these, the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) is the big gorilla, about six times as big as the next biggest pension system, with about 1.5 million members and over 150 billion in assets, as of its 2015 report.

The funded ratio of the TRS – the ratio between estimated assets and estimated liabilities, stands at 80.2 percent – or just at the point where reasonable observers feel comfortable most of the time. Remember, 100 percent means fully funded, but many funds do just fine running in perpetuity in the 80 to 90 percent region.

Meanwhile, the time to amortization – the estimated number of years it will take to fully fund teachers’ pensions – stands at 33 years, which is a bit on the high side. The Pension Review Board would prefer 15 to 20 years, but according to the state legislature, 40 years is the panic point, statutorialy speaking.

Finally, TRS estimates investment returns of 8% going forward, which seems too high to me, roughly in the top quartile of estimates. It’s not totally out of line with other pensions nationally, but it’s not a conservative estimate either.

One of the next biggest, the Employees Retirement System of Texas (ERS) resembles TRS in the sense of a 76.3 percent funded ratio, as well as a 33-year amortization, or time to pay down its unfunded liabilities. Back in 2014, the ERS reported an “infinite” amortization time period, essentially meaning it would never pay off its debts. So while 33 years is uncomfortably long, it also represents a step in the right direction from the previous years. The ERS also assumes an 8% return, which again isn’t conservative.

The two other big pension systems right now appear in healthier shape than either TRS or ERS. The Texas Municipal Retirement Systems (TMRS) scores higher than the first two, with a funded ratio of 85.8 percent, and an easier 17-year amortization. It’s 7 percent return assumption also means it has more room for error in its model, in case markets do not cooperate over the coming decades.

Meanwhile, the Texas County and District Retirement System (TCDRS) has a pretty comfortable 90.5 percent funded ratio, meaning estimated assets cover nine-tenths of estimated liabilities. In related news, actuaries estimate it will take only 9 years to amortize its debts. These levels for the TCDRS look good enough that the 8 percent return assumption feels less threatening.

texas_pensionTaken as a whole, these four systems indicate acceptable levels of risk as of now. They also mostly compare favorably with pension systems in other states.

A little panic

Ok, do you want to be a little bit scared? Fine, I’ll help you.

Josh McGee, Chairman of the Texas Pension Review Board, points out that these four big pension plans in general, and the Teachers Retirement System in particular, run an additional risk beyond the normal risk – simply based on their massive sizes.

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“You want to see something really scary?”

You see, if a small pension plan goes bust, a responsible government entity has a problem of filling in the hole, but the hole might be, and hopefully is, manageable through belt-tightening, cutting future benefits, and higher taxes.

But the TRS, with an unfunded future liability a little more than $33 billion, is too big to fix, if something goes terribly wrong.

Just to attach a sense of scale to the $33 billion figure, the state of Texas spent about $112 billion on everything last year, so it’s not like a $33 billion hole can be solved by any reasonable measures. TRS looks fine-ish right now, but failure is too big a financial risk for the state to run, so extra caution is needed.

I still say “Don’t Panic” but I’d also say don’t get too comfortable either. A little bit afraid might be just right.

A version of this post ran in the San Antonio Express News

 

Please see related posts:

Public Pensions – Don’t Panic, Use Heuristics

Public Pensions – Dallas Police and Fire Pension System Clusterfck

Public Pensions – Houston Might Have a Problem

 

 

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Public Pension System Heuristics

dont_panicDouglas Adams’ Hitchhikers Guide To The Galaxy famously advised us on the book cover “Don’t Panic,” and I think that’s a useful starting point for discussing public pensions in Texas.

You see, I started by wondering “should we panic?” when I began a personal project of studying public pensions, for a variety of reasonable suspicions, which I’ll share. After sharing my suspicions, I’ll tell you what I think the informed citizen – that’s you and me! – should worry about, and monitor, with respect to Texas pensions. Next week I’ll tell you specifically more about the biggest public pension plans in Texas.

The stakes for these multi-decade math models are particularly high for cities and counties that offer pension plans to employees.

Just ask the folks of Central Falls, Rhode Island (2011), both Stockton and San Bernardino, California (2012), and Detroit (2013), where insufficiently-funded and/or overly generous pensions sent those governments into bankruptcy protection. The City of Chicago is currently engaged in a multi-year game of chicken over its pension benefits. Some see bankruptcy as the future for Chicago, or possibly its public school district.

My suspicions

My first suspicion began because we’re in an environment of extremely – historically significant – low returns from bonds, such as 1 to 2 percent over the next ten to thirty years. Meanwhile, almost all public pension plans in Texas routinely model a 7 to 8 percent annual return over decades. That assumed annual return matters because with even a moderate allocation to bonds, risky assets like stocks have to make up the difference. Stocks and other things in the pension investment portfolios – like private equity and real estate – have to return 10 percent or more on average – every year for decades – just to make up the high returns that bonds can’t. That seems like an uncomfortable assumption over the next few decades. That made me suspicious.

On top of the current market environment, pension plans always represent some of the most complex financial systems in the universe. Complexity makes me suspicious too.

Actuaries, the poor souls charged with solving the math problems to figure out whether pensions will support public workers in old age – or conversely drive governments into bankruptcy – have a lot to keep track of.

Tracking the money going into a pension may at first seem relatively straightforward, depending as it does on employee headcount, employee salaries and contributions, and employer contributions. It gets a little trickier when you have to make assumptions about long-term investment gains – for the next thirty years.

Money paid out of a pension plan, however, really increases the complexity. The easy part of the equation here are the costs of administering a plan. The hard part comes from the fact that payouts generally continue for the life of workers. We don’t know exactly when people will die, so actuaries have to accurately model the expected length of the lives of workers. They also have to estimate when workers will separate from employment, and when they will claim benefits, and how much those benefits will be. On top of that, they have to model such things as dependent-spousal benefits, as well as rates of disability, both of which increase benefit payouts.

Ideally, these actuarial estimates need to work over long time periods. Contributions made to support a thirty year-old worker today may need to fund payouts for that worker fifty years from now. That’s a long time to estimate anything.

It seems analogous to those scientists at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio who planned the science behind the New Horizons space probe of Pluto launched in 2006 who then waited for a few seconds of planetary flyby in deep space in 2015. I picture these scientists sort of praying at launch ten years ago, like, “I hope our math works?”

No, pensions are easier (although in some ways harder!) than that Pluto mission, because there’s a political component to public pensions. If the teacher’s or policeman’s fund runs out in ten years, they don’t just throw up their hands and say “whoops, don’t worry about it.” Instead taxpayers – that’s you and me – will pay one way or another to honor previous public pension commitments, even if generally future retirees after that take a hit as well.

So how do we make sure public pensions are on the level, despite their complexity, and despite historically low returns from bonds?

One answer is first, not panicking. And then, vigilance. That’s what former Texas State Comptroller Susan Combs urged through her office with the publication of the 2014 report “Your Money and Pension Obligations,” and the creation of a searchable pensions database.

But how to you continue vigilance in the face of all the complex moving parts of public pensions?

I’m a big fan of that Texas Transparency site. You can see important data online, and I’m here to tell you the three things to look for in that public data.

Heuristics

My frequent answer to complexity: Heuristics! (I love that word.)

I mean, rules of thumb. Here are the three main rules of thumb that pension board members use to figure out whether their plans are healthy or in trouble.

First: Are liabilities (future payouts) at least 80 percent covered by money already in the pension plan? This is called the “Funded Ratio.” If you’re at 80 percent, then you’re pretty good. It doesn’t have to be 100 percent. Less than 60 percent and you’ve got a potential problem.

Second: If you have a shortfall – meaning your future payouts are less than 100 percent funded – then how quickly can you pay down your debts? Is the estimated time to pay off any pension shortfalls between 15 and 25 years? If yes, then according to the Texas Pension Review Board (PRB) you’re probably good. State law (HB 3310) and PRB Guidelines sets up a maximum of 40 years or else they start to get all up in your pension’s grill with reporting requirements and restrictions on benefits.

Third: Are the return assumptions over the next thirty years reasonable?

Reasonable right now means something kind of within the range of what other pension plans assume. NASRA – The National Association of State Retirement Administrators, but you probably already knew that – reports the average return assumption nationally as 7.62%.

As I’ll mention in a follow-up story on Texas’ Big Four Pension plans, three out of four of the state’s biggest pension plans assume annual returns above that average, with an assumed annual rate of return of 8 percent. Sadly, we can’t expect Texas to be the financial equivalent of Lake Woebegone, where all the market returns are above average. I wouldn’t conservatively plan on anybody consistently being able to earn an 8 percent return over the coming decades, especially when bonds return 1 to 2 percent. And even small “misses” on that measure, compounded over decades, can cause huge headaches down the line.

So yeah, I’m worried about that measure for millions of public employee retirees, and then I’m worried for all the taxpayers acting as unwitting backstops to those pension plans.

A version of this post appeared in the San Antonio Express News.

Please see related post:

Dallas Pension Plan – An Example Of What Can Go Wrong

The Big Four Texas Pensions

Houston Pensions – Worth Monitoring

 

 

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More on (MORON) Public Money For Private Sports Owners

This may seem like small-ball (because it is!) but I can’t sit idly by when my city’s government proudly announces their intention to shovel $75 million of public money toward building a minor-league baseball team stadium. This makes me so angry.

I earlier nominated municipal attempts to lure the Oakland Raiders to San Antonio as ‘The Worst Financial Idea of 2015,” so careful readers of this space will not be shocked to learn my view of the city’s planned $75 million taxpayer-subsidy for a downtown minor league baseball stadium.

elmore_sports_group
Do these guys deserve $75 million?

I’ve read three opinion pieces in the last three weeks opposing the plan, and I agree with all three. I’ll offer my finance perspective below, but it’s worth reading and reviewing the other sports and visioning reasons for why this deal stinks.

Opinions against

Express-News sports columnist Roy Bragg rightly points out that AAA baseball is a bizarre reach-for-mediocrity for San Antonio. It’s a kind of “I hope we make it to the third tier of US cities!” that isn’t something we should aspire to, much less pay for with public money.

Express-News opinion columnist Josh Brodesky reminds us “there’s a reason why ‘minor league’ isn’t a compliment,” as he recalls counting the fielding errors during AAA-baseball games he watched as a kid. Teams at the AAA level resort to fan-friendly gimmicks because the game quality can’t compete with the pros.

Bob Rivard argues persuasively that on the one hand we should prioritize $75 million subsidies for other, more broadly-beneficial projects for the city. In addition, Rivard writes, baseball is a backward-looking sport for San Antonio, appealing to a kind of 20th Century fanbase when compared to the potentially 21st Century fanbase that professional soccer would enjoy here.

I agree with these writers on all points.

My own views

My own opposition stems from a mixture of finance and ethics. Financially, economists have proven stadiums to be a bust, while ethically I cringe at using public money to subsidize private sports owners. If sports owners want to build their stadiums for their for-profit businesses, I’m excited to be their fan. I don’t think we should be taxed to line their pockets, while other extraordinary needs in the city go unmet.

What economic development?

The finance case for building a stadium – all that promised ‘economic’ development’ – has been roundly debunked by economists,  even if San Antonio’s leadership ignores the evidence. But it’s hard for residents who actually live in the neighborhood of The Alamodome (like me) to ignore that great white elephant’s footprint, as empty as the promises that got it built in the first place. Should I even mention the (lack of) development going on around Wolff Stadium and the AT&T Center, or is that too easy?

Not just finance

More than a finance perspective, however, I see the public financing of private businesses like stadiums in starkly moral terms.

I understand public financing of stadiums as a political strategy dating back to the Roman Empire, when ‘Panem et Circenses’ (Bread and Circuses) helped keep public order. The populi could pack into the Coliseum to spend a pleasant afternoon watching lions rend Christians limb from limb, to forget about their troubles for a while.

You and I might reasonably disagree on the best alternate use for $75 million of public funds. Rivard makes the compelling case that stimulus funds to revitalize the Broadway corridor represents a broad public good within a forward-looking city-wide agenda. Money is always scarce, so if we spend $75 million to subsidize one man’s baseball team, we don’t have that money for other worthy project like this one. I agree.

roman_colliseum
Thumbs Down to Taxpayer financed sports stadiums

I look at it this way: How can we publicly subsidize a privately-owned business by $75 million to move downtown, when we have pressing obligations to address more basic human needs?

You know what gets me angriest about the planned $75 million subsidy for this stadium? The public sacrifice – not literally of persecuted Christians – but rather of what I learned growing up were Christian values, like being my brother’s keeper.

How do I make that ethical leap? Earlier this week the Express News reported that 1 in 4 children in Texas lives in poverty. Food insecurity for kids, in the same neighborhood where some sports owner gets a $75 million subsidy, means neglecting something fundamental. It means the ‘Bread’ part of San Antonio’s political bargain has been sorely neglected.

How can we justify everyone footing the bill for this stadium in ethical terms?

Imagine if our tax collector sent a $58 check (that’s $75 million divided by 1.3 million people) to every city resident, accompanied by a note and stamped envelope, urging them to just endorse the check over to the private owners of a baseball team? How many families could pass it on, or instead would need to use it to relieve their hunger that week? Hunger – most poignantly children’s hunger – is a kind of invisible sickness that erodes the foundations of an ethical society.

Nearly two years ago Mayor Ivy Taylor began to build her city-wide support in one of her first acts as Interim Mayor by shutting down a downtown transportation plan for streetcars that had festered long past its overdue date. This AAA-Baseball Bread & Circus plan – without even enough bread to go around! – is ethically and financial unworthy of our city, and requires another act of political courage by city leadership to stop it in its tracks.

 

Please see related article

Worst Financial idea of 2015: Bringing The Raiders to San Antonio

 

 

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