Book Review: Money and Power – How Goldman Sachs Came To Rule The World


The book cover – featuring a view of planet Earth presumably from a heavenly vantage point – offers the first hint that William D. Cohan’s plan here is not critical thinking but rather hyperbolic imagery.  Inside he writes a survey not of Goldman, Sachs & Co.’s overall history but rather of historical points selected for potential embarrassment to the firm.

As the consensus choice for the Wall Street firm that escaped the least scathed financially from the credit crunch, paradoxically, Goldman Sachs’ reputation became the most tarnished by its role throughout the 2007/2009 crisis and the years leading up to it.  After a calamity like the Great Credit Crunch, the general public and its commentators need a villain.  And it stands to reason, goes their thinking, that the Wall Street folks who broke even or came out ahead must have been the same ones who both caused the crisis and set themselves up ahead of time to benefit from it.

Cohan and his publisher clearly sought to benefit from this demand for a scapegoat.  Unfortunately Cohan seems determined to find a scapegoat more than he tries to put recent financial events into context that helps explain them.

If you’re looking to save time, skip to the final quarter of the book.  Cohan features Goldman’s mortgage department traders and some of their most successful trades in 2007 and 2008.  Cohan managed to get Josh Birnbaum, a key part of Goldman’s ‘Big Short’ trading team throughout 2007, to speak on the record and in depth about who did what, when, and to whom.  Now, it should be acknowledged here that Michael Lewis’ book about this period and the traders who got the The Big Short right is about five times more interesting than Money and Power, but crucially Lewis could not get Goldman’s employees to speak to him.  Lewis settled for a Deutche Bank trader and other more obscure hedge fund traders.  Cohan gets the journalistic prize of landing the insiders of Goldman, the firm that the public cares the most about.

The first three-quarters of Money and Power, however, did not need to be written, and certainly don’t have to be read.    The majority of Money and Power follows the rise and reign of Goldman’s leaders throughout its history.  He clearly interviewed a wide number of leaders and partners of the firm.  Less impressively, a majority of his chapters rely almost entirely on secondary sources such as earlier books, newspaper coverage of scandals, and feature pieces in industry magazines.  Lawsuits and SEC investigations provide the rare primary source document.

Cohan highlights a few gossipy items of interest, in particular clashes between the firm’s leaders throughout the years.  Given the recent collapse of MF Global, Jon Corzine’s massive risk appetite and his trading losses in 1994 seem particularly relevant.  Also relevant is Corzine’s long-time alliance with Chris Flowers, who installed him as head of MF Global, and earlier became an uncomfortable catalyst of conflict between Goldman’s leaders Corzine and Hank Paulson in the lead-up to the firm’s IPO in 1999.

Paulson clearly provided extraordinary access to Cohan and manages to come out looking the best among Goldman’s modern leaders, a trick Paulson also pulled off with journalist Andrew Ross Sorkin in Too Big to Fail.

If you need an illustration of how Cohan chose headlines over substance, look no further than his Prologue.

The Prologue describes in detail Senator Carl Levin’s (D-Michigan) cross-examination of executives in the Goldman mortgage department in front of his investigatory committee in 2010.  The hearing highlights Levin’s blustering unwillingness to listen to the testimony he’s asking for.  Levin repeatedly cuts off answers, refuses to acknowledge complexity, and grandstands for the cable news networks.

As Cohan tells it, Levin makes the point at the end of his Congressional cross-examination that as a lawyer, Levin knows not to represent both sides of a deal.  To do so, Levin lectures, would introduce undeniable conflicts of interest that would harm his client, his firm’s reputation, and the ethics of law practice.  Levin points out that as a broker working both sides of a CDO transaction, Goldman has badly served its clients and wrapped itself in a web rife with conflicts of interest.

It’s a fine-sounding point, and we can imagine a number of cable news hosts at the time pursing their lips in prim agreement with the venerable Senator’s analogy.

Levin clearly doesn’t get, however, or will not admit to getting, what a broker-dealer does all day.  By definition, a financial broker-client relationship is not an attorney-client relationship.  Attorneys always, or most properly, represent one side of a deal, but financial brokers do not.  There are almost always two sides to the client transaction, and the broker buys from one client and sells to the other client.  Cohan should know this, as does anyone who has ever worked in the securities business, but he doesn’t bother to point out the obvious flaw in Levin’s analogy.

Next Cohan describes the SEC actions against Goldman’s CDO structuring desk, built on the evidence of a pair of emails, one from a senior manager who describes relief at the end of a ‘a shitty deal’-  and the other in which a relatively junior CDO structurer worries to his girlfriend about the end of a financial window for selling his product.  The ‘smoking gun’ found by the SEC was only an empty water pistol, but that did not stop Cohan from describing the actions as if they are solid evidence of wrong-doing and moral breakdown.

Cohan concludes his Prologue with what’s meant to be a shocker about selling shares in Facebook in 2011.  For this, Cohan needs to be quoted in full:

“How could Goldman get comfortable, in January 2011, with offering its wealthy clients as much as $1.5 billion in illiquid stock of the privately held social-networking company Facebook – valued for the purpose at $50 billion – while at the same time telling them it might sell, or hedge, at any time its own $375 million stake without telling them that its own private-equity fund manager, Richard A. Friedman, had rejected the potential investment as too risky for the fund’s investors?”

Now here again, Cohan could prove that he knows how broker-dealers work – but he fails to give the obvious answers to his rhetorical question. First, the investment management arms of broker-dealers do not always, or even often, purchase the same investments as their clients.  Second, broker-dealers frequently have widely different valuations for assets than their clients.  Third, Goldman’s wealthy clients are allowed to, and often do, make purchases that differ, in important ways, from the purchases made by Richard A. Friedman for the firm.

I get the sense that Cohan did a Google search of Goldman just before sending his final book edits to his publisher in early 2011 and decided on one final zinger against the firm.  He should have restrained himself.  The Facebook example is the point where Cohan loses credibility as a financial journalist and becomes an author trying to capitalize on public anger by ignoring his own experience.  It’s too bad for Cohan that the point occurs in the Prologue.

How did Goldman Sachs come to “rule the world?”  It’s a great question, and a book that answered it would be a great book to read.  Unfortunately, Cohan provides almost no analysis to support his title.  Instead he presents Goldman’s history since at least 1929 as a series of scandals, bad behavior, and influence-peddling.

Is Goldman Sachs the real villain of the Credit Crunch?  Cohan effectively surveyed the popular mood and surfed the firm’s history for anecdotes to support this idea.  But there’s almost no comparative discussion in the book of Goldman’s role vs. the role of other Wall Street firms.  There’s also very little in the way of weighing evidence for Goldman’s centrality to the crisis vs. other important actors or explanations.  What we are left with instead is a survey of headlines throughout the firm’s history, and an unwillingness to explain what they mean.  The intelligent but non-insider audience will believe whatever they believed before picking up the book, and that’s a missed opportunity.

We need a book that leads the interested public through the complex issue of who is responsible for the Great Credit Crunch and the Great Recession, but Cohan’s Money and Power is not it.

Please see related post: All Bankers Anonymous Book Reviews in one place.

 

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Life After Debt Part IV: Another Bizarro World Villain

Continuing the theme of ironic historic statements in the light of present circumstances explored in Life After Debt Part I,[1] today’s bizarro world villain is Alan Greenspan.

No other financial celebrity (with the possible exception of Warren Buffet) carried more weight a decade ago than then-Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan.  So when he said in 2001…

The most recent projections from OMB and CBO indicate that, if current policies remain in place, the total unified surplus will reach about $800 billion in fiscal year 2010, including an on-budget surplus of almost $500 billion. Moreover, the admittedly quite uncertain long-term budget exercises released by the CBO last October maintain an implicit on-budget surplus under baseline assumptions well past 2030… Indeed, in almost any credible baseline scenario, short of a major and prolonged economic contraction, the full benefits of debt reduction are now achieved well before the end of this decade — a prospect that did not seem reasonable only a year or even six months ago. Thus, the emerging key fiscal policy need is now to address the implications of maintaining surpluses beyond the point at which publicly held debt is effectively eliminated.[2]

… people listened.

And what they heard from Greenspan in 2001 was, “we deserve a tax break” given the impending massive federal surpluses.  Greenspan further went on to warn us of the problems of investing the federal surplus, just as the economists at Treasury had worried about in the ‘Life After Debt’ memo.

When I read this, even eleven years later, my face tightens up and my lips curl outward and my stomach gathers into a little tiny ball and I just start spitting f-bombs at Greenspan’s image on the computer screen.  The way he used his financial celebrity and political capital in 2001 drives me bonkers.

Now, I know the world is too complicated to blame all of our problems on the heads of a few individuals or institutions, and especially on the head of one person.  But, if I was forced to name the biggest enabler of our country’s shift in the past decade from surplus to deficit, from creditor to debtor, from strength to weakness, from leader to follower, I’d pick that guy.

If only he’d used his powers for good instead of evil.



[1] Also, please read related posts Life After Debt Part II and Life After Debt Part III

[2] If Greenspan’s bureaucraticoeconomicspeak needs translation, he’s saying something like: “The government’s statistics office says we’ll have a federal surplus by 2010, which will continue to grow, under reasonable assumptions, through 2030.  We just realized this 6 months ago.  Now the big issue to worry about is what to do with our surpluses.”

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Interview Part I: Greek Businessman on the Government’s Bloat, and A Solution

Please click above to listen to full interview.

Part I – This conversation is not with a banker in recovery, but rather an old friend of mine named Mihalis who comes from a prominent Greek family.  Greek finance is the tail currently wagging the European dog, and Mihalis is one of the most insightful people I know.  I figured he could explain what’s going on.  I started by asking him about recent Greek Parliamentary elections.

Mihalis: Maybe it’s my personal bias but you know Parliament the way it works it’s really like the HR department of Greece Incorporated.

Mike: The HR department employs as many people as possible?

Mihalis: Yes, its votes in exchange for jobs and that’s the root of the problem.

Mike: you are saying the Greek Parliament is an HR system essentially for the country.

Mihalis: Yeah the whole public finance was used to give salaries to people.  If you looked at the workforce of Greece, basically you have 1 million employees directly or indirectly dependent on the state. You have 1 million self-employed people and 1 million people who work in companies as employees.  In Greece you have about 800,000 companies, so the average FTE – you know full-time equivalent – is something like 2 1/2. In Europe or America that’s like 100.

So essentially out of these 3 million you now about 1 million unemployed.  So the situation is really, really bad.

MIHALIS BEGAN TO EXPLAIN TO ME THE CORRUPTION AND BLOAT OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, AND THE  UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND THEIR BANKING ENABLERS, AND THE CAPTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM BY BANKERS.

Mihalis: Half of the people… You know, you walk into a government building and you see half of the officials, they are honest people, they would like to work, they have some ideals they have some skills. But, they are completely demoralized, by the other half, which are jaded lazy, they bought their position because of a vote, and they pollute the whole system.  So, you can’t easily distinguish the two, so you’ve got to let a little bit of the forces to weed out the good from the bad.  And the only way to do that is to reset it.  They been trying to cut down the state, no one has really wanted to do it so they haven’t succeeded.  All they did was to displease the people.  Because they lowered their salaries, they’ve cut their benefits.  They started saving, doing a little bit more oversight on things. But all they’ve ended up doing is creating an even higher resistance to change.

Mihalis: The voters suddenly said well…So long.  We’re not going to vote for you anymore.  We’re going to vote for somebody who promises us even more jobs. The guy promised 100,000 more jobs after the election if he wins the election.  Crazy.  Right now the Greek government could function with 100,000 people. And it has 800,000 people.

In many ways, you know you have a few bankers, mostly of Greek origin, in the Greek desks of the big banks in Europe, maybe about 100 people, and they were just lending money to corrupt politicians. For nothing, just to cover up the problems of every year’s budget.  And this happened for like 15 years in a row at least. And then you had a collusion, with the politicians that want to appear you know with numbers that are smooth, attractive, and you start lying with statistics and blah blah blah and again Greece in the periphery was not a problem to worry about it was too small.  And that’s a recipe for disaster.

It’s a matter of popularity yes, in order to be a politician you need to be popular.  To be a good politician you need to actually make some wise decisions.  The problem is today politicians are neither wise nor make decisions.  They’re sort of dragged along by bankers.  The banking system is the backbone of the world, and they’re driving political decisions today. And it’s sort of putting the carriage before the horse, in many ways.

Mike: as an ex-banker myself I always, well, one main motto “Follow the money.”  Or if you’re wondering why the politicians are doing certain things, it’s generally wise to figure out what are the bankers asking them to do. It’s a good rule to follow. Wondering why people are acting like they’re acting, I find.

I ENJOYED HEARING MIHALIS, WHO I KNEW TO BE A PROGRESSIVE, LEFT-OF-CENTER GUY, SOUND LIKE WHAT WOULD BE IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT A TEA-PARTY TYPE APPROACH –  RADICALLY SHRINKING WASTEFUL GOVERNMENT TO ONE EIGHTH OF ITS CURRENT SIZE.  I WANTED TO CHECK WHETHER HE HELD SIMILARLY RADICAL VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL BUSINESS AND GETTING THE GOVERNMENT OUT OF THE WAY OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT TO REVIVE THE GREEK ECONOMY.  IT TURNS OUT, IN A STRONG SENSE HE DOES.

Mihalis: You know, the Greek are realists.  With a built-in distrust for the state. Because the state treats you as a liar and as a thief and you treat the state back the same respect. You know I don’t respect you. I don’t expect that you give, that you will protect my wealth. I actually expect that you will take away my wealth because in Greece since the 1980s the whole notion of entrepreneurship has been demonized and we haven’t reached the point yet where we de-penalize entrepreneurs.

Mihalis: There was a model in the 1960s of entrepreneurs that were [taking advantage] of the laborers, and taking the money out, and not paying taxes. There were a few examples like this but they were ruined. This became one of the popular themes of the Socialist government that we don’t like business people, we don’t like capitalists. Because they keep all the wealth for themselves and keep everyone else unwealthy.  Again that was an abuse, that was Greek hyperbole. Deep down if you don’t have entrepreneurs you cannot have growth. And that has been part of the stifling of the Greek economy. Rather than boosting or helping entrepreneurs, it’s always there fighting against them. So you have then entrepreneurs fighting back. Evading taxes, trying to find any kind of way to protect themselves.

Because they know sooner or later that the state is going to go against them. Because it’s a small market as well, the scale is so small.  In the US if you’re an entrepreneur you have such a big market.  You don’t have to fight over the stakes.  Fighting is fierce when the stakes are low.  You fight over nonsense because there’s little to go around.

And we’re talking about the key problem.  Let the economy run. The Greeks can do very well in a very, very chaotic environment.  They don’t need a society. They don’t need the comfort of the state like the Germans do, or the Chinese do.  Greeks can survive no matter what. All you need to do is get the big state out of the way.  Because the Greeks were like, they chose the easy way.  The easy way which is o, the state can feed me and I can give my vote to it. And everything can’t be fine. But this doesn’t work and somebody has to publicly say that the people.  And if the money flow has to stop, it has to stop.

TO MY TEA PARTY FRIENDS WHO THINK AMERICAN FREEDOM UNIQUELY SUPPORTS AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MIHALIS SEES THAT GREEK ENTREPRENEURS HAVE A SIMILAR CULTURAL CALLING.

Mihalis: It’s a byproduct.  Freedom was born in Greece.  Greeks are free and I think that’s a byproduct.

MIHALIS AND I SPOKE EXTENSIVELY AFTER THIS ABOUT HIS OTHER SOLUTIONS TO THE GREEK CRISIS, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AS WELL AS THE ROLE HIS FATHER CURRENTLY PLAYS ON THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SCENE IN GREECE.  I’LL LEAVE THOSE FOR A FOLLOWUP PODCAST IN PART II.  IN THE MEANTIME, MIHALIS WOULD NOT LET ME PAINT HIM AS A RADICAL RIGHT WING GUY IN THE TEA PARTY MODE.

Mihalis: I mean you’re talking about an abuse of things. There’s been an abuse of the state.  Of the welfare state.  I’m definitely pro-welfare state, because I feel that the world is not perfect. The right wing guys are privileged, strong, they never had to suffer, and that’s why they see the world in their own eyes.  And the world is not like that. You need a welfare state.

There are ways and ways of funding it. In the Greek case it’s been abused.

In PART II of this conversation, Mihalis discusses further European integration, and his father’s role in Greek politics today.

 

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UK’s FSA Gets It, Barclays Traders Did Not

It’s easy to pick on government regulators for not ‘getting it’ when it comes to finance, but I’m pleased to read the UK’s FSA report on Barclays’ actions and punishment related to LIBOR rigging.  The FSA gets it.

The traders, on the other hand, do not get it, which is hard to fathom.  Everybody I ever worked with on the trading floor knew different types of communication lend themselves to certain media.

A few select passages from the FSA report on electronic messages by Barclays traders:

“If you breathe a word of this I’m not telling you anything else”

“If you know how to keep a secret I’ll bring you in on it”

“We need a really low 3m[1] fix, it could potentially cost a fortune. Would really appreciate any help.”

Did nobody teach these guys?  Manipulation of this sort never gets written down.  Insidery gossip over the phone must be spoken in code.  If the information is particularly juicy, make the call on a personal cell, as all firm phone lines are taped.  This was very sloppy work by the Barclays guys.



[1] 3month LIBOR

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What Is LIBOR Rigging? Why Should You Care?

What is LIBOR Rigging? 

LIBOR, which stands for London Interbank Offered Rate, is defined as the average benchmark interest rate at which the world’s 16 most important money-center banks willingly lend money to one other for a period of time, with the most frequently quoted time periods being 1 day, 1 month, 3months, or 6 months.  The British Bankers Association[1] determines LIBOR daily (and this is important for understanding the rigging process engaged in by Barclays traders) by surveying the Treasury departments of the world’s biggest banks about what rate they pay to borrow money from other banks, and then by taking an average of their answers.

LIBOR is the most important financial benchmark interest rate for trillions of dollars in lending.  While the US Federal Reserve sets an individual benchmark interest rate in the US through overnight lending to US Banks, the Fed cannot determine at what rate most of the world’s banks and largest companies lend to one another.  LIBOR sets the standard rate for that type of interbank lending, as well as the standard rates for swaps trading.    It’s a mostly invisible (to the average citizen) piece of financial architecture underlying, frankly, almost every major lending transaction in the world.  If you can effectively manipulate LIBOR, you can end up shifting billions of dollars from one bank to the other.[2]

Barclays got fined for evidence of LIBOR-rigging in the 2005 to 2007 time period, when the bank evidently submitted lower interest rate quotes than other surveyed banks.

Barclays paid their $453 million fine based on electronic message records evidence[3] that its Treasury officials cooperated with its trading desk in reporting a LIBOR rate lower than its actually borrowing rates between it and other banks.  While we do not know precisely the reason Barclay’s Treasury department cooperated in a scheme to report artificially lower borrowing rates to its trading department, the obvious presumption is that somebody’s profit and loss in the trading department was extremely vulnerable to a rise in LIBOR rates.  Trading desks with LIBOR-dependent positions could be caught wrong-footed in a fast-moving interest rate environment, and a little help in keeping LIBOR nice and low at a certain level for a certain amount of time until the desk could unwind its position could have meant saving someone’s career or annual bonus.[4]

LIBOR’s survey and averaging method for determining rates is meant to avoid rate-rigging like this.  The only way in which Barclay’s cheating could work systematically would be if the trading desk had access to people willing to cheat at other major banks.  Therefore the interesting question of the Barclays situation is if regulators can find evidence of widespread cooperation from other banks’ Treasury departments, which of course regulators are trying to do, with investigations ongoing at a dozen of the world’s largest banks.

In the larger sense LIBOR represented, up until recently, a successful self-regulating mechanism between banks.  Self-regulation only works if participants as well as regulators feel comfortable that the system works as advertised and cannot be captured by cheaters.

What’s really interesting and ironic about the Barclays situation is that by the time the Credit Crunch of 2008 got fully underway, Barclays reported higher rates than its peers, in what’s assumed to be an honest reflection of its actual borrowing costs, which should have been lower on average than its peers because of its relatively strong financial condition.  In other words, the other 15 LIBOR survey banks, on average, lied to appear more credit worthy than they really were.

In fact, Barclay’s head Bob Diamond complained in 2008 to the Bank of England that its competitors appeared to be reporting artificially low borrowing rates, which they likely would have done to mask the fact that they were having financial difficulties in borrowing from fellow banks.  A number of commentators pointed out (e.g. here  here and here) at the time that LIBOR had ceased working in 2008 as a reliable benchmark.  Barclays was one of the good guys at the time, while shakier banks ceased cooperating appropriately, ie. telling the truth.

Barclays’ outlier status in reporting higher than average rates attracted attention from Paul Tucker, a Bank of England official[5], who suggested directly to Bob Diamond’s deputy Jerry del Missier that the Bank of England would appreciate lower reported borrowing rates from Barclays.  Lower rates, presumably, would help signal financial calm, as well as keep costs low for financial institutions, during a time of crisis.

The problem with a nudge like that is that manipulation from the Bank of England is just like trading desk manipulation, and it undermines the financial architecture in just the same way.

Again I’m speculating a bit, but Diamond appears to have made sure that particular Bank of England nudge got released to the press in advance of his fall last week, possibly in a misguided attempt to show UK regulators that they were the ones complicit in the breakdown of LIBOR during the 2008 time period, not Barclays.  Regulators and central bank officials do not appreciate being exposed as manipulative liars, so expect the blame-Bob-Diamond excitement to get full-throated support from a number of UK central bank and regulator sources.

Market participants have long known that LIBOR manipulation was rampant in the lead-up and during the Credit Crunch of 2008.  Central bankers also knew.  The self-regulating process of LIBOR, indeed the entire money market system, ceased working in 2008.  One Federal Reserve friend of mine told me in late 2008 that the interbank borrowing market (of which LIBOR is a major part) was completely frozen, and that in the US, only the dramatic intervention of the Federal Reserve[6] kept up the illusion at that time that money could properly flow between financial institutions.

Only central bankers could keep the system afloat.  Some of this intervention, we sort of know from the Bob Diamond strategic release, took the form of subtly encouraging banks to lie on their LIBOR surveys.  Other interventions came in more straightforward ways such as the unprecedented financing by the Federal Reserve of dodgy collateral. [7]

What I mean by this last point is that the central banks and regulators of the US and the UK grossly manipulated money markets regularly to hide the true financial weakness of a number of financial institutions.  Bank of America and Citigroup, to take two easy examples, should have disappeared long ago if not for the money market sleight-of-hand via:

1. The Federal Reserve providing unlimited and nearly free funding to Too Big To Fail Banks.  This it continues to do.

2. Treasury providing equity capital unavailable from the market.  This has now been paid back by Citigroup and Bank of America, but they were the last ones to do so, of  the big US Banks.

3. Frequent waivers and special treatment in the past 4 years on unmet reserve requirements.

Why do I care when this happens?  I care because tens of thousands of private individuals reap the benefits of this thumb on the scale by regulators, while the public at large remained on the hook for the liabilities.  Just as a LIBOR manipulation shifts the economics of a swap from one counterparty to another, bank bailouts shift the economics of the banking sector from a one group of losers to another group of winners, and not necessarily in a fair or transparent way.

I really do not know what to make of the “LIBOR scandal,” except that I’m torn in a few directions.

On the one hand, clearly, lying and cheating on a key market survey is bad.  Especially by traders who need a lie to fix their Profit & Loss statements and save their bonus.  Barclays got punished, and their CEO resigned, as is just.

On the other hand, the hand-wringing and heavy sighing from regulators and commentators over the ‘Barclays LIBOR scandal’ misses the big picture about all the folks who manipulated money markets in the Credit Crunch of 2008, and when, and why.  When traders distort money markets, that’s manipulation.  When regulators and central banks distort money markets to pick winners and losers, that’s just good policy?  I don’t know.  It’s not so clear to me.



[1] This is a self-regulating trade association representing approximately 250 of the world’s largest banks.  It is most famous for organizing LIBOR, in cooperation with media company Thompson Reuters, but it also advocates on policy issues on behalf of its member banks.

[2] I’m sticking an example of why this is so in the footnotes as it can get a bit technical.  LIBOR gets quoted in % terms as an interest rate.  A simple interest rate swap could go as follows:  For a period of 10 years, Counterparty A agrees to pay Counterparty B a fixed rate of 3.25% of $1Billion, in exchange for Counterparty B agreeing to pay a variable rate of 6month LIBOR +0.25% (in my example, to keep the math simple, I’ll quote 6month LIBOR at 3% to start).  At the outset of the trade, each counterpart owes each other $3.25 million per year, so the trade is done ‘at the market.’  Over time, A will always owe $3.25MM per year, but B’s payment amount resets every 6 months, as 6month LIBOR will change over the course of 10 years.  Market conditions will ordinarily shift 6 month LIBOR over time, which makes the trade economically favorable for A or B over time.  If at some point, through manipulation, 6month LIBOR could be artificially lowered by, say, 0.05% for a year, then B would owe $500,000 less in that year.  When you consider the $ Trillions in notional interbank lending and derivatives trading, it’s clearer how small changes in LIBOR drastically alter the economics of trades for counterparts.  Market participants only agree to use a benchmark interest rate like LIBOR if they believe it is not open to systemic manipulation.

[3] Traders, seriously, why are you writing this down?  The first thing you’re taught in week one of trading class is to write down nothing of consequence.

[4] A typical trading desk could have hundreds, or in the case of a major broker-dealer like Barclays, thousands of LIBOR-dependent swap/derivative positions at any one time, many of which will be off-setting one another.  I’m in the realm of speculation now, but a trading desk with heavy exposure to a particular LIBOR reading (one that would involve asking for a little cheating help from one’s own Treasury dept) probably is not looking for a long period of market manipulation, but rather just a short-term fix until risk can be reduced, or an offsetting swap trade can be put on the books.  If Barclays’ trading desk felt overexposed by a lumpy $10 Billion trade and could get an improvement of just 0.01% in the LIBOR rate from its Treasury dept, that’s a million dollars saved right there.

[5] Up until recently thought to be next in line as the Head of the Bank of England

[6] in ways largely hidden from view

[7] As in the case of the Bear Stearns shotgun marriage to JP Morgan, the AIG bailout, and the Merrill Lynch shotgun marriage to Bank of America.  The Federal Reserve and the US Treasury took on extraordinary risk on behalf of the currency and US Taxpayer respectively in order to keep up an artificial illusion of bank financial health, similar to the LIBOR manipulation by the Bank of England.  When these financial institutions, surviving under essentially false pretenses, paid bonuses to their employees, no central bankers or regulator intervened.  I find this behavior unforgiveable.

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Diamond Out. AKA Blaming the Wrong Guy Again

We here at Bankers Anonymous love ex-bankers[1] so it makes sense to throw our two cents in to the discussion on the departure of Bob Diamond from the head of Barclays PLC this week.

Journalists love to attach the word “scandal” to his departure, and indeed Barclays got hit last week by a combined $453 million fine from US & UK authorities for LIBOR rigging.  At the risk of alienating both my financial and non-financial readers, LIBOR rigging deserves some explanation, which I will do in the next post.  But first, Bob Diamond actually deserves an honorary slow clap as he exits the building.

A few points in his favor:

Diamond spends this week being grilled by members of the UK parliament, in a mock trial similar to our own Congress’ recent treatment of Jamie Dimon, except with more paddle than flatter.[2]  The parallels to Jamie Dimon include both of their relative successes as risk managers and opportunists throughout the 2008 debacle. [3]  In fact, Diamond should be remembered as one of the few prudent banking heads of the 2008 Credit Crunch.  To paraphrase Kipling’s If Poem, Diamond kept his head when all the other banking heads were losing theirs in the Fall of 2008.  He managed to acquire Lehman’s North American business for $1.75 Billion, which given Lehman’s control of $639 Billion in assets, meant Diamond’s Barclays bought one of the most valuable banking assets in the world, essentially for free.  Not a bad trick.

Second, Diamond gets grilled this week by UK parliamentarians and regulators extra hard for the sin of being a US citizen.[4]  Barclays’ relative success through the crisis, and its grafting of the Lehman franchise to an old-line UK banking franchise has made him in the UK a convenient short-hand for criticizing perceived American cultural traits and their inappropriateness in the UK financial context.[5]  Just as there’s an underlying anti-Semitism to some of the populist element hatred for Goldman Sachs,[6] there’s an underlying anti-Americanism to the piling on of Diamond’s leadership at Barclays.

Third, to extend both the Jamie Dimon and Goldman comparisons, the shadenfreude at Diamond’s fall represents the kind of ‘blame the winner’ mentality which muddles the narrative on the Credit Crunch.  Dimon’s JP Morgan, Blankfein’s Goldman, and Diamond’s Barclays are virtually the only success stories of major bank heads navigating the Credit Crunch.  Barclays did not need, nor did it receive, a bailout from the UK government, or the US government.  This is incredible, and you can’t say that about any other of the other major world banks in 2008.

Yes, it’s true that all major financial institutions benefitted from the explicit and implicit guarantees and bailouts handed out willy-nilly during the height of the crisis.  But Barclays did better than anyone.  Anyone!  And yes, you can’t say that Diamond deserves all the credit for this prudent risk management. But we should acknowledge the relatively outstanding performance if we want to go beyond the simple narrative of “Bankers = Bad.“

Political leaders enjoy giving current bankers the woodshed treatment because it’s more riveting than chastising unemployed super-wealthy, golden parachuted ex-CEOs.  But seriously, what about the ones who actually screwed up their banks and still got paid?  They’re the ones more deserving of public shaming.[7]

Speaking of getting paid for terrible performance, another point in Diamond’s favor is the fact that he and two deputies had already agreed to forgo their bonuses in 2012 as the LIBOR scandal hit the news, a symbolic gesture which has rarely been matched by other banking heads in the US.  I’m confident Diamond will not suffer overly much from this loss of income, but I admire the voluntary approach and wish more executives would take a similar approach when their firms suffer losses or scandals.

Finally, let’s a raise a toast to Bob Diamond’s newly famous daughter Nell, pictured with her dad at the top of this post, as a result of her politically incorrect tweets, and retweeting other people’s attacks on her dad, on her twitter feed.  She was mentioned in this book (page 363) when she was a sophomore at Princeton, urging her dad to try to purchase Lehman Brothers out of bankruptcy.  She graduated from Princeton in 2011, which is as good an excuse as I can come up with for linking to this awesome must-see video by a recently graduated Princeton woman.



[1] Bob, hit me up with a DM, let’s do a podcast…

[2] That “more paddle than flatter” phrase makes more sense if you read the previous Dimon post, which you should do right now.

[3]Also, even their names are pronounced similarly!  What’s up with that?

[4] Which, just after July 4th makes me need to watch this video:  America! F Yeah!

[5] The British are more subtle than us Yanks.  An MP named Teresa Pearce tweeted her views of his American-ness in the following way: “Really annoying that Mr Diamond is using our first names. so rude.”  Way to stick it to the Colonies, Teresa!

[6] I mean in particular the famous Matt Taibbi description of Goldman Sachs as the “great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.”  It’s hard to escape the suspicion that the blood sucking image taps into an underlying mistrust of Jews.

[7] I named all these in an earlier post, but they deserve all the rotten tomatoes we can muster: Ken Lewis at Bank of America, Sandy Weill and Vikram Pandit at Citigroup, Stanley O’Neal at Merrill Lynch, Franklin Raines at Fannie Mae, Joe Cassano at AIG, and Angelo Mozilo at Countrywide

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